Wednesday, March 13, 2013

Clarification on Covert Testing at Newark (EWR)


You’ve likely read various media accounts of how our TSOs at Newark (EWR) missed an IED during covert testing -- training. I’d like to take a few moments to talk about covert testing at TSA since this has drawn so much attention.

TSA undergoes covert testing by The GAO, the DHS Inspector General, TSA’s Office of Inspection, and Local TSA staff. The aforementioned test was conducted by the TSA Office of Inspection. You’ve probably heard them referred to as the “Red Team.”

The goal of the Red Team is to build tests that push the boundaries of our people, processes, and technology. We know that the adversary innovates and we have to push ourselves to capacity in order to remain one step ahead. With that said, our testers often make these covert tests as difficult as possible. It’s not like they’re using a cartoonish bundle of dynamite with an alarm clock strapped to it. These items are extremely hard to spot.

You might be wondering why our testers run tests that our Officers are prone to fail? It’s because we want to see if our procedures, technology, and policies are or are not working. We also are constantly looking for ways to improve our performance. When a test is failed, we don’t simply check a tick mark in a box and move on. Nor do we take punitive measures as this testing is a learning experience. The results are shared with TSA leadership at the airport and HQ, as well as the officers who were part of the test, noting areas for improvement where warranted. The findings from these covert tests can result in changes to our policies and procedures, or even tweaks to our technology.

Also, it’s important to note that this specific covert test was only testing one of the 20 layers of security. It was checking one aspect of the Checkpoint Transportation Security Officer SOP. These other layers include behavior detection officers, travel document checkers, intelligence gathering and analysis, checking passenger manifests against watch lists, random canine team searches, and more security measures both visible and invisible to the public.  In a normal setting, all 20 layers would be working in concert; however, all layers cannot be tested in the same way. 

Since we’re on the topic of Newark, an article with comments from an alleged anonymous former Transportation Security Officer from EWR was posted over the weekend by the New York Post. It’s amazing how much credence a newspaper can give to someone who is not accountable for what he or she says. With that said, much of what this alleged former TSO had to say is just uninformed generalizations painted with a very wide brush. In the past, we have seen former employees who were terminated for wrongdoing quoted in stories like this one. As you might imagine, we think they have a credibility gap.

The TSA workforce carries out the agency’s transportation security responsibilities in support of our Nation’s counterterrorism efforts with responsibility and dedication. The Agency’s responsibilities include security screening of passengers and baggage at 450 airports in the United States that facilitate safe air travel for 1.8 million people per day. That is why we train for success.

Bob Burns 
TSA Blog Team


If you have a travel related issue or question that needs an immediate answer, you can contact us by clicking here.

48 comments:

Anonymous said...

"Nor do we take punitive measures as this testing is a learning experience."

To say that there will not be any negative impact on the TSO's credibility or performance assessment may be misleading. Can you post a picture of what the IED looked like? It may help other TSOs in the future be able to identify these elaborately disguised IEDs.

Anonymous said...

Mr. Burns.
Thank you for these blogs. I have read a couple of them and appreciate that you are being fairly transparent and are educating the folks who are using airports and who your team is trying to protect. I read some comments after your blog about the little girl and her stuffed animal - these were quite harsh. There are some very good people in every organization and a few people who do things that taint the same organization. You are making your organization look very good and I commend you on this. I appreciate the red-teaming and other quality control and quality assurance work you have at the TSA. It will never be enough but it does close the gap, it keeps employees on their toes, and it makes us safer. Thank you.

Anonymous said...

"other layers include behavior detection officers, travel document checkers, intelligence gathering and analysis, checking passenger manifests against watch lists, random canine team searches, and more security measures both visible and invisible to the public"

What a joke. I fly 3 times a month all over the country. No one ever talks to me so there is no "behavior detection", I never see dogs, documents are pathetically easy to fake, watch lists don't work if you book last minute and the TSA lacks any form of "intelligence". So yeah this red team proved once again that the TSA is a waste of time and money.

Anonymous said...

"To say that there will not be any negative impact on the TSO's credibility or performance assessment may be misleading. Can you post a picture of what the IED looked like? It may help other TSOs in the future be able to identify these elaborately disguised IEDs."

Although I agree that this would be of assitance to many TSO's, a picture or description of the aforementioned IED and/or componenets would be considered SSI and not appropriate for pubic viewing. You could probably direct your inquiry to your local FSD staff and obtain it through the chain of command. Best of luck!

Anonymous said...

"all layers cannot be tested in the same way"

My understanding was that the inspector simulated being a passenger and tried to smuggle contraband. Why wouldn't ALL 20-layers be tested?

The fact is that even after groping the passenger, a potential bomb was able to make it on to the aircraft. An electronic strip-search, then a groping and still the bomb made it onboard. Is this how TSA/DHS conducts risk-based security; or is this just how DHS/TSA is politically correct by strip searching and groping everyone!?

When tests like this are publicized, it only lets the terrorists know what they need to do to get a bomb onboard. It's good to know that TSA is tested, and to know what are the results of those tests. TSA has to implement risk-based security screenings, and strip-searching EVERYONE and/or groping them is not a "risk-based" approach!

I carry a US Govt issued Personal Identity Verification credential that was issued based on an Office of Personnel Management approved background investigation (National Agency Check with Written Inquiries), and a risk-determination by a federal agency. Why can't the PIV credential certify me as a "Trusted Traveler" and have me go thru a magnetometer (not the strip-search or groping) and my carry-on X-rayed? There are nearly 2-million federal and government contract employees. Accepting their PIV credentials (which can be electronically verified by challenging the biometric embedded on the credential) as a trusted traveler is a prudent and logical policy which providers a greater Return On Investment for the federal government and its citizens.

THAT IS A RISK-BASED APPROACH!

Anonymous said...

Excellent, excellent, excellent response, Mr. Burns!

Anonymous said...

"I’d like to take a few moments to talk about covert testing at TSA since this has drawn so much attention."

Translation: Oh, crap. People noticed. I better come up with some spin, fast!

"The goal of the Red Team is to build tests that push the boundaries of our people, processes, and technology."

Finding a bomb is not "pushing the boundaries". It's the most basic part of your jobs!!

"We know that the adversary innovates"

Translation: the TSA thinks hiding a bomb in your groin is "innovative".

"our testers often make these covert tests as difficult as possible"

Um, good. Cuz if there were terrorists, I doubt they'd make it easy.

"we want to see if our procedures, technology, and policies are or are not working."

BULL. We ('the People') have been telling you for YEARS and YEARS that your policies DO. NOT. WORK. And you have done nothing about it.

"Nor do we take punitive measures"

Translation: 'Work for the TSA. If you don't do your job, we won't discipline you!'

"this specific covert test was only testing one of the 20 layers of security."

The '20 layers thing' has been debunked before.

"other layers include behavior detection officers"

Who FAILED. Unless it's completely normal for someone to be carrying a (fake) bomb in an airport. BDO's should have picked up on the guy with the (fake) bomb. But they didn't. That's TWO layers that failed.

"travel document checkers"

Did the tester have a real flight to catch? No? Then they couldn't have a real boarding pass, then. So, FAIL for the document checkers. That's THREE layers Failed.

"checking passenger manifests against watch lists"

How about just checking to see if the person being screened is even on a passenger manifest at all? FAIL again, FOURTH one now. Do I really need to continue?

"much of what this alleged former TSO had to say is just uninformed generalizations painted with a very wide brush."

Yet, you admit that you don't discipline screeners for failing at their jobs. Hmm. And other parts of the ex-employees story is borne out by passenger observations and previous incidents.

"In the past, we have seen former employees who were terminated for wrongdoing quoted in stories like this one."

And, in the past, we have seen screeners get away with much more egregious actions. What's your point?

Anonymous said...

Great government whitewash, as usual!

Anonymous said...

"Clarification on Covert Testing at Newark (EWR)" - posted by Bob Burns (TSA Blog Team) at 9:33 AM on Mar 13, 2013

Mr. Burns.
Thank you.... - March 13, 2013 at 10:14 AM

Can't you at least wait a full hour before you have your friends/co-workers post astroturf?

Anonymous said...

I (and others) noticed you didn't address any of the specific issues raised by the ex-employee. Let's take this one at a time:

Do you use internal employees to run tests? Yes or No?

"When there are internal tests, conducted by the Newark training department, it’s easy to cheat because they use our co-workers. You could be working with someone all morning, and then they’re gone. Word gets around the checkpoint. Someone will come over to you and say, “Hey, it’s Joe. He’s got a blue duffel bag.”"

Anonymous said...

Not long ago I was witness to one of these random "tests" at a TSA screening check point. While waiting in line a female TSA worker walked in front of me and placed a red bag on the conveyor belt leading to the X-ray machine. As she did so an inert M67 training grenade rolled out of the bag and off the conveyor belt. I have been in law enforcement for some time and recognized it immediately as a training aid. Somehow I was able to catch it mid fall and handed it back to the TSA lady who had placed the bag saying something like "Here is your grenade." She grabbed it from me while almost yelling at me, "I could have you arrested for saying grenade!" She placed it back in the bag and it then went through the X-ray machine whereup the screener at the X-ray machine simply said, "X-ray shows a grendade". Well no kidding! You just watched her cut in line, place the bag, the grenade roll out of the bag, me catch and hand it back, the grenade placed back in the bag and the bag enter your X-ray machine. I would sure hope you were able to spot it!

Security theater at its best....and simultaneously its worst.

Anonymous said...

> Can you post a picture of what the IED looked like? It may help other TSOs in the future be able to identify these elaborately disguised IEDs.

Yikes!! Please don't, I'd prefer that the bad guys not get an idea of what something that passed detection looks like !

Anonymous said...

If the organization will allow Internet users the means to be involved in this process what guarantees are in place to ensure that "the testers" will remain in service for an appropriate time frame after a test has been performed? Questions have been raised as to the integrity of certain individuals and them being "here today and gone tomorrow" for a price.

Anonymous said...

Bob,
I enjoyed this article, and i have been through a couple of airports in the past and I have had some things taken and thrown away. The major thing that I lost was a container of tire sealant ( Slime) bought from Harbor freight in Spokane Wa. We were visiting our Grand kids at Christmas time. We also bought some modeling clay from a craft store wile were out there ( they were on sale and not as available here in S.E. Ma. I purposely did not open the factory seal on these items Hoping anyone inspecting them would know they were not anything other than what was labeled on the package. They opened the clay and checked it completely and resealed it and labeled that they had done so. This was all in checked luggage so I have no idea what was done until we arrived home 3,000 miles later. The airports that we have been through are PVD, TPA,GEG, and LAS that we had to go through security check points. Other than long lines we have not had any trouble with TSA agents even though my wife is in a wheel chair.
The only suggestion I would make is it would be nice if the agents smiled a little and not be like the N.Y. TV police show where they do not crack a smile.

Randy said...

Re: "You might be wondering why our testers run tests that our Officers are prone to fail?"

No, I'm not wondering that! I would say that would be the Red Team's JOB! If the Red Team can't come up with a test that the screeners fail, then you should abolish the Red Team.

Anonymous said...

What is the current failure rate on these tests? The last GAO report I saw said the TSA missed 70% of test items. Is that still accurate and if not, what is the failure rate?

Tests like this make me question the effectiveness of the TSA. However it really makes me question the amount of money we spend each year on the TSA. If the failure rates for detection are so high, wouldn't there have been a succesful terrorist attack since 9/11? Either that or the TSA would have caught a terrorist. This leads me to believe that the terrorist threat to aviation or anything in this country is not as constant as the TSA would like us to believe.

Randy said...

Re: "In the past, we have seen former employees who were terminated for wrongdoing quoted in stories like this one. As you might imagine, we think they have a credibility gap."

So you're saying that this person is terminated employee that has an ax to grind, so we shouldn't listen to him. Or are you just *hoping* that we make that inference. That's a low blow if it's not true.

His criticisms are either valid or invalid. Since you didn't address them, they must be valid.

Anonymous said...

Wouldn't the journalist who interviewed the former TSO at Newark have done some background work to make sure they were actually talking to a former employee? I know I would make sure of that if I was writing a story.

Congratualtions on finally having some common sense and allowing knives onboard planes again. Don't let the airlines bully you into changing your mind.

RB said...

"We know that the adversary innovates and we have to push ourselves to capacity in order to remain one step ahead"

How do you know this? What evidence can TSA show that supports this unsubstantiated claim?

"These other layers include behavior detection officers, travel document checkers, intelligence gathering and analysis, checking passenger manifests against watch lists, random canine team searches, and more security measures both visible and invisible to the public. In a normal setting, all 20 layers would be working in concert; however, all layers cannot be tested in the same way."

What science supports the TSA BDO program? None that is peer reviewed!

How does checking an ID provide increased security?


Recently the spokesman for Federal Law Enforcement Organization(Air Marshals) said passengers are expendable. Is that position held by TSA and if so why are passengers considered a layer of security?

"Since we’re on the topic of Newark, an article with comments from an alleged anonymous former Transportation Security Officer from EWR was posted over the weekend by the New York Post."


Regarding that article what exactly was not true in the piece?

"The TSA workforce carries out the agency’s transportation security responsibilities in support of our Nation’s counterterrorism efforts with responsibility and dedication."

This is just not true as to many TSA employees have violated the public trust by being thieves, perverts, murderers, and other various criminal types. Hardly a week goes by without a report of some TSA employee violating a persons civil rights at an airport.

TSA gets no respect because TSA does not respect the public!




Anonymous said...

Gotta love the spin

"Failure is success".

Glad to see the Sequester hasn't stopped TSA PR....

Money so well spent...

Anonymous said...

OMG, Bob!

YOU are criticizing an article on a newspaper for it's "credibility gap"?

And you really, truly believe the TSA doesn't have one?

You diluted the news report of the former TSA agent within your "we were supposed to fail the test" article, convinced we would not notice????

Give Me A Break!!!!!!!

Anonymous said...

What a ridiculous attempt to excuse yourself for your failures. The TSA fails tests because it is a failure at its job. And if it did continuosly strive for improvement as you implicate, if wouldn´t continue to fail, and actually get worse with time.

Susan Richart said...

OK, Bob, explain this one away:

A man who had just raped his girlfriend managed to get through security at FJK with a stun gun in his bag today.

Therefore, 2 layers of security failed: your checkpoint screeners and the BDOs.

screen shot

Anonymous said...

TSA FAILS REAL TEST AT KENNEDY!

Martin Vaughan said...

Wow... it might be nice if you knew what you were talking about!

But hey... flying 3 times does make you an expert... NOT!

Anonymous said...

Every time I walk through a TSA checkpoint, I ask myself "is this the best American can do?" The TSA is pathetic and a national disgrace.

Anonymous said...

Anonymous said...

I (and others) noticed you didn't address any of the specific issues raised by the ex-employee. Let's take this one at a time:

Do you use internal employees to run tests? Yes or No?


Actually, Bob DID answer that:

"TSA undergoes covert testing by The GAO, the DHS Inspector General, TSA’s Office of Inspection, and Local TSA staff."


So, why the lie, Bob?? First you say the "alleged" ex-employee has no credibility, then you confirm exactly what he says.

Anonymous said...

Uh oh, Bob, you may have said too much.

http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/bomber_botch_gets_the_tsa_ok_gXZQkzjvdT3pB1YDSWWQcL

«Rep. John Mica (R-Fla.), who heads the powerful Government Operations Subcommittee and helped create the TSA, said Burns violated national security protocols by disclosing details of the Newark test on the blog.

“The first thing I have to do is investigate how much they’re paying for their blog team,” Mica told The Post.

“Here you have some guy on a blog, which is a questionable expenditure of that agency, confirming that it was a failure. That’s the last thing TSA should be doing on a blog or publicly . . . This [blog] should be a primary candidate for sequestration.”»

Anonymous said...

Despite the fact that a weapon that does not look like a Loonie Tunes rocket may not be detected by the very expensive TSA scanners, I will still be confident that my family is safe from attack the next time a TSA "officer" lets me through a checkpoint after having felt up my inner thigh while wearing a prophylactic glove in a manner that, in any other context, would constitute felony sexual assault. For the pat downs are one of the 19 other layers of TSA aviation security. And G-d forbid one of the officers should decide to feel up my six-year-old daughter. Would you care to weigh in, Senator Paul? (He is our newest American Hero.)

Anonymous said...

"Anonymous said...

What a joke. I fly 3 times a month all over the country. No one ever talks to me so there is no "behavior detection", I never see dogs, documents are pathetically easy to fake, watch lists don't work if you book last minute and the TSA lacks any form of "intelligence". So yeah this red team proved once again that the TSA is a waste of time and money."

BDOs don't just go up and talk to every single person in the airport. They monitor people's behaviors. So how would you know if watch lists don't work if you book last minute? "Under the Secure Flight program, passengers making a reservation are required to provide their full name (as it appears on the government-issued identification they plan to use when traveling), date of birth, and gender.

TSA matches this information against government watch lists. After matching passenger information against government watch lists, Secure Flight transmits the matching results back to airlines so they may issue passenger boarding passes."-TSA.gov

Whether you book a flight months, weeks, days in advance, or 10 minutes before the flight, your information is being vetted against the watch lists. If you receive a boarding pass then you know that you were checked against the watch list because Secure Flight gives the permission for you to print your boarding pass. At least create a legitamate argument instead of spewing out uneducated attacks.



dennis douglas said...

I am hoping the same finest operate from you inside the potential also.

Anonymous said...

Is a turkey sandwich a liquid or a gell?

Anonymous said...

"I carry a US Govt issued Personal Identity Verification credential that was issued based on an Office of Personnel Management approved background investigation (National Agency Check with Written Inquiries), and a risk-determination by a federal agency. Why can't the PIV credential certify me as a "Trusted Traveler"



A certain US Army Major in Texas had a PIV and carried a top secret clearence and still managed to fool everyone and killed soldiers on their home base in AMERICA! Yeah trust pretty much doesnt work anymore. deal with it.

Anonymous said...

>>> Anonymous said...
Is a turkey sandwich a liquid or a gell?<<<

Depends on how hungry the screener is.

Anonymous said...

>>> Anonymous said...
Is a turkey sandwich a liquid or a gell?<<<

Depends on how hungry the screener is.

Anonymous said...

Bob, you failed. Your test failed, your employees failed, and people are not buying this whole "well, they're hard to spot" malarkey. IT'S YOUR JOB TO SPOT THEM!! And don't blame a former employee for spilling the beans on low morale in the agency as the reason that your organization is considered a joke.

TSORon said...

Anonymous said...
[[My understanding was that the inspector simulated being a passenger and tried to smuggle contraband. Why wouldn't ALL 20-layers be tested?]]

They are, but they cannot be tested in the same way. What’s so hard about that? Or are you wanting us to hire a group of actual terrorist’s and add them to the Red Team?

[[I carry a US Govt issued Personal Identity Verification credential that was issued based on an Office of Personnel Management approved background investigation (National Agency Check with Written Inquiries), and a risk-determination by a federal agency. Why can't the PIV credential certify me as a "Trusted Traveler”]]

If you truly possess a PIV badge then you know that to verify it would require a computer connected to a secure network, and your PIN, at every TDC that is designated as a “Trusted Traveler” lane, and at any TDC where the airport does not have a “Trusted Traveler” lane. Read through the thread, how many people already complain about TSA’s cost? Read through the other blog posts, read the news reports. Are there not better ways to spend the (minimum) $20 million dollars annual cost for your suggestion? How do you suggest we justify the cost for the additional $40 million to install all of these systems as you suggest, when it only adds another 1% of passengers to the “Trusted Traveler” program?

Believe it or not, it’s not all about you the individual traveler, it’s about all of them.

Anonymous said...

REF: “A certain US Army Major in Texas had a PIV and carried a top secret clearence and still managed to fool everyone and killed soldiers on their home base in AMERICA! Yeah trust pretty much doesnt work anymore. deal with it.

I didn’t realize they put Major HASAN went through a metal detector before he pulled his gun. Obviously you didn’t read the entire posting. I didn’t say let PIV credential holders bypass. I said give them a less intrusive screening based on the BI the US Govt performed. We allow them into federal facilities of all sensitivity levels and also on the federal IT systems, but we screen them like hardened criminals when they attempt to fly.

The TSA test shows that there is no 100% foolproof security. My comment was to say that there are some w/i the US whom have undergone heightened screening (database checks, neighborhood interviews of neighbors, etc.) that is a lot more than strip search and groping at an airport. The PIV has biometrics on it that can be challenged by TSA to provide a nearly foolproof, 1:1 match for the individual carrying the credential. The US govt is THE LARGEST EMPLOYER in the USA (this includes contractors who work for the USG and are issued the PIV credential). SO there are many who hold this credential (and it does not include their spouses, children, etc.).

TSA can do better to determine who needs heightened scrutiny. Weeding the USG credentialed people out (like we do the pilots and flight attendants) is a gigantic leap towards better detection of ne’er-do-wells because it eliminates the noise created by “trusted travelers” who are in more intense screening procession, allowing the TSA screeners to concentrate on a smaller set of people.

Lastly, HASAN did not have a PIV . . . he carried a CAC (Common Access Card), and the DOD CAC does not comply with the PIV requirements. Where do you find that he held a TOP SECRET clearance?

Anonymous said...

Anonymous said...
"A certain US Army Major in Texas had a PIV and carried a top secret clearence and still managed to fool everyone and killed soldiers on their home base in AMERICA! Yeah trust pretty much doesnt work anymore. deal with it. March 14, 2013 at 1:36 PM"


How very sad. You think 312,999,999 Americans are not trustworthy because of the egregious actions of one. Do you distrust your family, friends, co-workers too?

Anonymous said...

>>A certain US Army Major in Texas had a PIV and carried a top secret clearence and still managed to fool everyone and killed soldiers on their home base in AMERICA! Yeah trust pretty much doesnt work anymore. deal with it.<<

And yet TSA claims these same people should be trusted and receive less scrutiny at the screening chokepoint. I know I feel safer now. Thank you, TSA, for being both completely irrational and totally useless.

Anonymous said...

"I carry a US Govt issued Personal Identity Verification credential that was issued based on an Office of Personnel Management approved background investigation (National Agency Check with Written Inquiries), and a risk-determination by a federal agency. Why can't the PIV credential certify me as a "Trusted Traveler"

Becasue you got to pay the gov't $100, get figerprinted, and background checked again before you can keep your shoes on and leave your laptop in the bag while going through security, duh!

Anonymous said...

Anonymous said...
Is a turkey sandwich a liquid or a gell?

Depends on whether or not there is a cupcake packed with it.

Anonymous said...

"In the past, we have seen former employees who were terminated for wrongdoing quoted in stories like this one."

TSA terminates former employees? TSA is being exposed as the feckless organization it is.

Time for reform and the implementation of real security.

Anonymous said...

Becasue [sic] you got to pay the gov't $100, get figerprinted, and background checked again before you can keep your shoes on and leave your laptop in the bag while going through security, duh!”

Obtaining a PIV credential IS NOT paying the govt $100. Educate yourself; do an Internet search and find what the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Federal Information Processing Publication 201-1 (FIPS 201-1), OMB Memorandum 05-24, and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12) has to say about PIV credentials, and what it takes to obtain one!

My suggestion about accept PIV credentials as Trusted Traverlers was a way for the TSA/DHS/US Govt to remove some of the noise that TSA Officers face when screening passengers for air travel; possibly enabling them to more effectively screen passengers and work to eliminate successful penetration by terrorist.

Anonymous said...

"Obtaining a PIV credential IS NOT paying the govt $100. Educate yourself; do an Internet search and find what the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Federal Information Processing Publication 201-1 (FIPS 201-1), OMB Memorandum 05-24, and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12) has to say about PIV credentials, and what it takes to obtain one!

My suggestion about accept PIV credentials as Trusted Traverlers was a way for the TSA/DHS/US Govt to remove some of the noise that TSA Officers face when screening passengers for air travel; possibly enabling them to more effectively screen passengers and work to eliminate successful penetration by terrorist."

I was alluding to the $100 you have to pay the gov't to get your fingerprints and background check conducted before you are allowed to use the TSA Pre-Check lanes. Perhaps I did not make that as clear as I should.

Anonymous said...

Anonymous said...

Gotta love the spin

"Failure is success".


I hear WAR IS PEACE, FREEDOM IS SLAVERY, and IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH.

My Big Brother told me.

cliffontheroad said...

to Anonymous above; glad you explained the $100 fee (which I understood in your previous posting, but your critic did not).

And to Anonymous above that, why the heck can't you pick name/URL and enter a name, any phony name would do, instead of clicking Anonymous as an identity. No email address is asked, just some TEXT. Big brother could find you if they wanted no matter what, but with so many clicking on Anonymous, it makes it a pain to follow who, whom, ....

Anonymous said...

Second attempt to post...

Security credentials are issued so that a person can complete a job. They are not awarded to someone just because that person has high moral integrity or is "better" than other people. With that in mind, and realizing that credentials can be faked or stolen, having PIV credentials does not mean that you should be exempted from the screening that the rest of us have to undergo.